I would define my research as a simultaneous search for rigor and relevance because it permits me to integrate my academic career with society, particularly with the students in the classroom. My work does also require relevant understanding of business analytics and big data manipulation.
My research interests are in the area of diversification and corporate strategies centered in a competitive bilateral context. Currently, I am working on several papers and also on my dissertation proposal, which is made up of three papers and will be finished this summer. One of those papers, where I am the first author, is a biform game that examines the conditions under which appropriately-constructed side payments allow a two-sided unbalanced payoff—until the point that one party faces a loss—business opportunity to occur. I presented this paper at the AOM 2017.
I am currently working on two empirical papers, which are also part of my dissertation; I am writing them as a solo author at this point. One of those papers centers on predicting acquisition premiums and post-acquisition performance by using an adaptation to the paper with the theoretical model that I presented at the AOM 2017. The story in this empirical paper is about bilateral opportunism: then, the acquirer’s understanding of the target’s valuable resources limits the target’s opportunistic behavior to obtain a larger premium. Later, the same knowledge limiting the target’s opportunism also explains ex-post acquisition performance. I will present this paper at the AOM 2019.
I am also working on a paper that I submitted to the SMS conference, which explores CEO hubris but from a bilateral perspective. For example, I review the case where, given that both CEOs are not hubristic, the acquisition premium tends to be lower, and post-acquisition performance positive. The main theory is that, in the case where both CEOs’ aspirational levels have been modified upward, they have over-expectations about their capability to extract rents. Thereafter, the target’s CEO interprets the premium as insufficient given his or her unreasonable upward expectations about his or her capability to extract rent from the standalone firm. Similarly, given his or her exacerbated self-confidence—hubris—the acquirer’s CEO become less sensitive to large acquisition premiums because the CEO overestimates his or her ability to generate returns compared to the target’s administration. Finally, I am also participating as a third author in a paper exploring CEO career horizon and governance selection mode.
Grove, S., Fox, B. C., & Souder, D. (2017). Coordination Equilibria: Formalizing a Path Forward for Value Creation. In Academy of Management Proceedings (Vol. 2017, No. 1, p. 11926). Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510: Academy of Management.